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AN AF(FUR)MATIVE DEFENSE: USING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A DEFENSE TO




"Until a character becomes a personality, it
cannot be believed. Without personality, the
character may do funny or interesting things, but
unless people are able to identify themselves with
the character, its actions seem unreal. And
without personality, a story cannot ring true to
the audience. "
Walt Disney'
Mascots 2 are different animals. They bring some of our
favorite characters from screens, packages, and comic book pages
to life. Moreover, mascots serve a particularly important role on
university campuses, offering a point of communal continuity3
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thank Professor Danielle Weatherby for her constant support. Her mentorship through this
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1. NORMAN M. KLEIN, SEVEN MINUTES: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE AMERICAN
ANIMATED CARTOON 48 (1993).
2. This Article will refer to mascots as costumed characters that exist in the real world.
Generally, this term will be specifically referring to characters whose suits completely cover
their human selves. The term will not refer to two-dimensional logos or animations, even of
the same character. The term additionally does not refer to live animal mascots.
3. See Patrick Woodhead, The Importance of Brand Consistency, MEDIUM (July 16,
2018), [https://perma.cc/WA6F-HKP7] ("People['s] brains look for consistency, patterns,
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amid inevitable organizational changes. Although university
buildings, athletes, faculty, and staff will eventually change, a
mascot remains an inter-generational reference point for fans and
alumni.4  Indeed, a mascot gives a representative persona to
universities, enabling those universities to more intentionally
interact with fans and the community.5 But a mascot can only
attain this significance by creating and perpetuating a unique
personality. It must strive for a relatable authenticity that allows
fans to see the mascot as more than simply a person in a suit but
instead as a real, inimitable character. Stated succinctly, a mascot
must create a new persona, the spirit of a university, by paying
particularly close attention to its look, mannerisms, and
personality across time.
6
Traditionally, universities protect their creations from
competition and alteration through intellectual property law.
7
Mascots, however, implicate a legal doctrine that falls outside the
scope of most trademarks, copyrights, and patents--employment
law. This is the first piece of literature to address the intersection
of intellectual property and employment discrimination doctrine
in the context of mascot hiring. It illuminates the competing
interests of universities, which seek to maintain consistent,
distinct mascots to obtain intellectual property protection but also
regularity. Over time, a consistent brand will generate trust and retain customers."); see also
William Arruda, Why Consistency Is the Key to Successful Branding, FORBES (Dec. 13,
2016), [https://perma.cc/B9QD-2ZCM] ("Consistency is the key to successful branding.").
4. See e-mail from Jimmy Sanchez, Dir. of Mktg., Univ. of Ark., to author (Mar. 14,
2019) (on file with author) ("When fans see our mascots, they are filled with not only school
spirit[] but also fond memories of attending games as a child."); see also e-mail from Jacob
Sehauf, Mascot Coach, Univ. of Minn., to author (Mar. 5, 2019) (on file with author) ("A
character has been established over decades[,] and it connects people of all generations.
They all experience the same cheeky and mischievous Gopher, [the Minnesota mascot,] and
when they tell stories, whether [they are] young or old, everyone has had an experience with
a similar character.").
5. See Sanchez, supra note 4 ("Without mascots, a lot of our ideas on improving fan
engagement[] would be just that. Ideas. They are the living and breathing embodiment of
what we are trying to do from a marketing perspective by making meaningful connections
with our fans at our venues.").
6. This concept can be traced back to Will Durant who, in discussing the philosophy
of Aristotle, wrote, "[w]e arc what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a
habit." WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 98 (2006).
7. See Traci Dreher Quigley, Commercialization of the State University: Why the
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 Is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
2001, 2003-04 (2004); see generally Jacob H. Rooksby, University
TM : Trademark Rights
Accretion in Higher Education, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349 (2014).
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express a commitment to abide by employment discrimination
law. Ultimately, this Article argues that, in most circumstances,
a prospective employee's legal rights should be subordinate to a
university's intellectual property rights in the protection of its
mascot.
Consider, for example, the relationship between
employment law and intellectual property rights at the University
of Arkansas. 8 The University of Arkansas has five mascots: Big
Red, Sue E., Pork Chop, Boss Hog, and Ribby. 9 Each character
is a personification of a Razorback, a pig with soft, red fur. Sue
E., for example, is a female Razorback with hair bows, a
cheerleading uniform, and pom-poms. She manifests what would
traditionally constitute a feminine personality, as demonstrated by
Sue E.'s swaying hips and flirtatious demeanor towards younger
male fans. Pork Chop, by contrast, is a gender-neutral Razorback
that stands shorter than 5'1" and wears team jerseys. Pork Chop
has a very child-like personality; it runs with its arms spread like
airplane wings and pranks fans.
Every spring, the University holds tryouts for each of its
characters. Students from across campus audition, hoping to be
the "face" of the University for the next year. To illustrate,
consider the following hypothetical. A sophomore student,
Charlie, wants to tryout as either Sue E. or Pork Chop. Charlie,
however, is a 6'5", 210-pound male whose build derives from his
high-school football career. Before tryouts even begin, the
University dismisses Charlie from the tryout process. The
University says that Charlie cannot tryout for Sue E. because his
build does not match Sue E.'s. The University explains that
Charlie is also unable to tryout as Pork Chop because the height
limit for the character is 5'1". Upset, Charlie considers filing suit
for gender discrimination.
In this instance, the law should permit the University to
discriminate in order to preserve its intellectual property rights
8. The following hypothetical is based on real mascots at the University of Arkansas,
but the actual scenario and the policies stated are fictitious for the sake of this Article. For a
visual depiction of the referenced characters, see Spirit Squads, ARK. RAZORBACKS,
[https://perma.cc/8TFG-T4B2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
9. Through its extended use, the University has acquired common law trademark rights
over these characters. See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d. 1018, 1022-
23 (11 th Cir. 1989) (stating that common law trademark rights are acquired and retained
through actual and continuous use of a mark in commerce).
2020 817
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
over its characters. While advocating for the subordination of
employment rights is perhaps controversial, there are two critical
factors that render mascot hiring distinct. First, a court's
prohibition of selective mascot hiring would inhibit the
University's efforts in maintaining a distinct, protectable mark.
This factor is especially significant because mascotting only
constitutes a student's temporary opportunity but the University's
perpetually protectable right. Second, mascots make up a
negligible percentage of the job market. 10 Thus, the University's
limited ability to enforce strict hiring criteria in this context would
not cause widespread organizational discrimination.
This Article will serve three general purposes. First, it will
give the legal community insight into the world of mascots.
11
Second, it will provide a novel, yet legitimate, defense to selective
mascot hiring criteria. Finally, this Article provides universities
with tangible practices that legitimize the proposed defense and
reinforce their intellectual property rights.
Part II of this Article will provide a brief background of the
legal doctrines involved in potential mascot litigation, namely
employment discrimination law and intellectual property law.'
2
While it will focus primarily on the protections offered by
trademark law, it is worth noting that mascots, as fictional
characters, dwell in the trifecta of intellectual property right
protection. 13 Part III will analyze a university's ability to protect
its mascots and intellectual property under current employment
discrimination law. 14 First, this Article will examine the hiring
10. In my years as a mascot, as well as a coach, the mascot program never exceeded
eleven athletes.
11. The legal scholarship regarding mascots has been minimal at best. As a point of
recent controversy, a relatively significant amount of literature has focused on racially-
charged mascots, although the material is not referring to costumed characters. See, e.g.,
Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings, Progress Realized?: The Continuing American Indian
Mascot Quandary, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 309 (2008). Additionally, some literature has
addressed mascots, tortious acts, and fans' assumption of the risk. See, e.g., Christian H.
Brill & Howard W. Brill, Baseball Mascots and the Law, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 105 (2016).
12. See infra Part ll.
13. Universities can protect their characters through trademarks, copyrights, and
patents. See Michael Todd Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The
Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial
Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 629 (1992); Kathryn M. Foley, Protecting Fictional
Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 938-
39 (2009); Mascot Suit, U.S. Patent No. D562,530 (filed Mar. 28, 2005).
14. See infra Part III.
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criteria through the bona fide qualification defense to a disparate
treatment claim. Next, it will examine the criteria through the
business necessity defense in a disparate impact case. Part IV will
advocate for a modified defense, as proposed by Professor
Elizabeth Rowe in her article Intellectual Property and Employee
Selection.15 Finally, Part V will address additional criteria in
which this defense might be applicable. 16
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the tensions between employment
discrimination law and intellectual property law in the context of
hiring mascots, it is important to first understand how the two
doctrines work individually. First, this Section will provide a
brief background on employment discrimination law and the
framework for disparate treatment and disparate impact suits.
Second, it will provide an overview of intellectual property law
which includes general protections and policies in relation to
mascots.
A. Employment Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196417 serves as the
vehicle through which an employee can file suit against an
employer for discrimination that occurred before, during, or after
employment. It explicitly prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."' 18 Other statutes and regulations, at both the
federal and state level, have since extended these prohibitions to
other areas such as age,' 9 pregnancy,20 sexual orientation,21
15. See infra Part [V.
16. See infra Part V.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-24 (1967).
20. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(1979).
21. While sexual orientation is not explicitly protected through a federal statute,
multiple states have extended their employment discrimination laws to cover the class. See,
e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 12920, 12921, 12926, 12940 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-34-402 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (2016).
2020 819
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gender identity, 22  genetic information,
23  and disabilities. 24
Plaintiffs have attempted to extend this broad list to additionally
include attributes such as height,25 weight,26 and appearance.27
While courts have yet to grant these extensions without a
disparate impact in one of the enumerated areas, scholars have
argued that courts should take a more expansive approach.28
An employee or applicant can bring a Title VII suit 29 under
one of two theories: disparate treatment
30 or disparate impact.31
A disparate treatment claim involves explicit discriminatory
employment practices and proof of discriminatory intent.32 To
succeed on a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the job;
(3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection
between the adverse action and protected classification. 33 Once
the plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
22. Similar to sexual orientation, multiple states have expanded employment
discrimination protections to gender identity. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12926, 12940,
12949 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7
(2019).
23. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat
881 (2008).
24. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-94 (2015).
25. See Fahn v. Cowlitz Cty., 610 P.2d 857, 858-59 (1980).
26. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-34 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Trump Wanted to Fire Women Who Weren't Pretty Enough,
Say Employees at His California Golf Club, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/YR8B-AMTT] (discussing a lawsuit filed for loss of meal breaks and
wages but highlighting alleged appearance discrimination).
28. See, e.g., Yofi Tirosh, The Right to Be Fat, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
264 (2012); see also Jane Byeff Kom, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25 (1997); Courtney N. Kubilis,
Note, "Weighting" for Protection in Massachusetts: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in
Employment, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 211 (2008); Isaac B. Rosenberg, Height
Discrimination in Employment, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 907 (2009); Elizabeth M. Adamitis,
Note, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in
Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195 (2000); Mila Gumin, Note, Ugly on the Inside: An
Argument for a Narrow Interpretation of Employer Defenses to Appearance Discrimination,
96 MINN. L. REV. 1769 (2012).
29. While an employee could bring an employment discrimination claim under a
variety of federal and state laws, this Article will focus on the use of Title VII as the legal
vehicle. Title VII is applicable to all public and most private institutions across the nation
and allows for this Article to utilize a consistent framework as compared to 50 different state
laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).
30. McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
31. Griggs v. Power Duke Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
32. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-04.
33. See id. at 802.
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employer to present a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
the seemingly disparate treatment of the employee.3 4 Upon the
employer's successful presentation of a legitimate reason, the
burden shifts yet again to the plaintiff-employee.3 5 The plaintiff
then has the opportunity to show that the "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" was mere "pretext" to the adverse
action.
36
The second theory under which a plaintiff can file suit is
disparate impact.37 This claim includes employment acts that are
neutral on their face but have discriminatory effects. 38  For
example, an employer's use of a facially unbiased test that
disproportionately excludes African Americans from the position
would potentially violate Title VII under the disparate impact
theory.3 9 To bring a successful claim, a plaintiff must first prove
a prima facie case by pointing to a specific employment policy or
practice of the employer that causes a disproportionate impact on
a protected group of which the plaintiff is a member.40  After
proving a prima facie case, the employer has two options. First,
he can present his own evidence to show that in fact his practices
do not disproportionately affect the protected group. 41 Secondly,
the employer can establish that the practice is "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity., 42 If
established, the plaintiff can still succeed by showing that "an
alternative employment practice" with a lesser disparate impact
exists that the employer "refuses to adopt.",43
The theory an employee chooses matters greatly because it
controls the defenses available to the employer.' Under disparate
treatment, employers can raise a bona fide occupational
34. Id.
35. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
36. Id.
37. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 644-45 (1989); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
38. Griggs, 410 U.S. at 432.
39. See generally Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (holding that if "an employment practice that
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, it is
prohibited, notwithstanding the employer's lack of discriminatory intent").
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), (k)(1)(A) (1991).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
44. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Intellectual Property and Employee Selection, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 25, 41 (2013).
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qualification (BFOQ) as a statutory affirmative defense.45 To
prove that the employment practice is justified under the defense,
an employer must show that: (1) a relationship exists between the
employee's membership in a protected class and the inability to
perform the job duties; 46 and (2) the job qualification goes to the
"essence" of the business operation.47 This narrowly tailored
defense has worked for some employers in limited circumstances.
For example, the court in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., noted
that gender was a BFOQ for a Playboy Bunny when the primary
purpose was to "titillate and entice male customers., 48 However,
in Wilson, the court refused to recognize gender as a BFOQ for
Southwest Airlines, which used women's "sex appeal" to "attract
male customers" in order to establish their "love airline"
campaign. 49 The court ultimately found that the airline's primary
function was "to transport passengers safely and quickly from one
point to another," which is not sex-linked.5 °
Alternatively, if the employee pursues the theory of
disparate impact, the employer still has a common law defense.
51
After the plaintiff proves her prima facie case of disparate impact,
the employer can show that the employment practice is necessary
to the business. 52 The business necessity defense is broader than
the BFOQ defense as courts have not interpreted it to be narrowly
tailored.53 It allows for broader justifications for employment
discrimination, like safety and cost, and can apply to all protected
classes, including race.
54
45. [d. at 42.
46. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991).
47. Id. at 203.
48. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292,301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (discussing
St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, No. CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. State Human Rights
App. B. 1971)).
49. See id. at 294-95, 304. The court even noted that the use of female-only flight
attendants brought about much of Southwest Airline's success at the time. Id. at 295.
50. Id. at 302 & n.25.
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B. Intellectual Property
Intellectual property protects the ideas and creations of
individuals. 55  This area of the law allows creators to protect
literary works,56 drawings,57 the look and feel of a business, 58 and
even mascots. 59  These powerful rights come through either a
filing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) 60 or through common law principles. 61 Within the area
of trademarks, this usually requires that the creator or filer show
that the creation is distinctive on its own or, if not, that it has
obtained a "secondary meaning," 62 which is to say that the public
associates the creation with the source of the good or service.63
Mascots, for example, have an identity, a persona, of their own
but also represent universities, 64 companies, 65 and sports teams. 66
After proving that secondary meaning or inherent distinctiveness
exists, the creator can then prevent others from infringing on his
ideas, through court action if need be. 67 This allows the creator
to maintain the integrity of his creation. 68
The power to maintain the creative integrity of the initial
creation imparts certain duties upon the creator, or primary
owner. The owner has a responsibility to control the now
55. See Intellectual Property, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1990).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
58. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-67 (1992).
59. See Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also
Harrison/Erickson, Inc. v. Chi. Bulls Ltd. P'ship, No. 91 Civ. 1585 (PKL), 1991 WL 51118,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1991); Corp. of Gonzaga Univ. v. Pendleton Enters., LLC, 55 F.
Supp. 3d 1319, 1329-30 (E.D. Wash. 2014).
60. See, e.g., Apply Online, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., [https://perma.cc/C922-
SU7D] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
61. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 56.
62. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
63. Id. at 766 n.4 ("Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or
dress 'has come through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source."') (citation
omitted).
64. See About Aubie, AUBURN U., [https://perma.cc/HCL2-9M2E] (last visited Oct.
26, 2019).
65. See Claire Suddath, Mickey Mouse, TIME (Nov. 18, 2008), [https://perma.cc/97QT-
WFST] (claiming that at one point Mickey Mouse "had a 98% awareness rate among
children between ages 3-11 worldwide.").
66. See About Benny, IWANTBENNY.COM, [https://perma.cc/MSQ8-2TER] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2019).
67. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
68. Id. at 775.
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trademarked creation so that it retains its "distinctiveness. "69 This
duty extends to the trademark's third-party users as well as the
primary owner."y While the primary owner may "license" the
trademark for others to use, it may lose its rights if the mark
becomes too generic7  or is poorly reproduced as to cause
confusion. 2  Similarly, the primary owner has the duty to
maintain the trademark's original look, lest the mark become
vague and abandoned.73 While an intellectual property theory
deemed the "tacking doctrine" may allow for some level of
variation, it does not permit owners to materially alter the
trademark and retain their rights without some subsequent
filing.
74
If the primary owner fails to control its own mark through
consistent use of the distinct likeness, a court may find that the
owner has abandoned the mark.7 5  Third parties may then raise
abandonment as a defense to infringement.76 Thus, the owner's
failure to control the consistency of his creation can ultimately
lead to a loss of all ownership rights.7 7  He may then have no
69. See THOMAS P. ARDEN, PROTECTION OF NONTRADITIONAL MARKS: TRADEMARK
RIGHTS IN SOUNDS, SCENTS, COLOR & PRODUCT DESIGN 1N THE U.S. 76 (2000).
70. See Radiance A. Walters, Partial Forfeiture: The Best Compromise in Trademark
Licensing Protocol, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 126, 126 (2009).
71. See Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 75, 100-01 (2014) ("People commonly use 'kleenex' and 'vaseline' generically, and not
simply to describe things like KLEENEX or VASELINE.").
72. See Movie Mania Metro, Inc. v. GZ DVD's Inc., 857 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2014) ("If the consuming public is unable to use the mark to distinguish a good as
originating from a particular source, the mark does not function as a trademark and is thus
not entitled to legal protection.").
73. See ARDEN, supra note 69, at 76 ("Inconsistency in the use of a mark, however,
can undermine a claim of long use sufficient to establish secondary meaning."); Donald S.
Chisum, Trademark Acquisition, Registration and Maintenance: A Primer, 19 AIPLA Q.J.
123, 184-85 (1991).
74. See 1 The Law of Advertising § 11.02(5)(b)(i) (2019). This doctrine is what allows
a company, Pepsi for example, to update their logo yet continue its intellectual property
interest in the older logo. The tacking doctrine is an "exceptionally narrow circumstance["
that allows for a company to protect its updated mark whenever it is the "legal equivalent"
of the previous mark and creates "the same, continuing commercial impression." Hana Fin.,
Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 910 (2015). Additionally, the new "mark should not
materially differ from or alter the character of the [previous] mark." Id. This requires a fact-
intensive inquiry and should typically be reserved for juries. Id. at 911. For a visual example
of the tacking doctrine see Trademark Tacking Examples, LEHRMACH (May 4, 2015),
[https://perma.ce/KZL3-ZDGM].
75. Chisum, supra note 73.
76. See, e.g., Warren Publ'g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402,434 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
77. See Walters, supra note 70, at 126.
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choice but to passively watch from the sidelines as his beloved
creation is used in all sorts of mediums contrary to his original
purpose.
7 8
Il. MASCOTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
WITHIN TILE EXISTING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION FRAMEWORK
Having outlined the general principles of employment
discrimination law and intellectual law, this Part shifts to the
compatibility of intellectual property rights in mascots with the
current employment discrimination law framework. Section A
will address how intellectual property law and the need for a
mascot's continuity of character fit within the BFOQ defense.
Section B will similarly address how these same factors fit within
the business necessity defense. The outcome of both parts is an
unworkable framework which does not adequately protect the
need of universities to maintain consistent characters.
A. Mascots as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Let us now return to our earlier hypothetical.7 9 Charlie (the
student) has now decided to sue the University for disparate
treatment on the basis of sex. Recall that the coach only
considered females for the job and immediately dismissed Charlie
as a candidate. Assume Charlie establishes the prima facie case
for an employment discrimination claim. The burden to prove a
justifiable reason for discrimination now shifts to the University
and coach. The University can still utilize Title VII's built-in
statutory BFOQ defense. 80
When analyzing a BFOQ defense, the courts apply a three-
part test.81 First, the need for discrimination must go directly to
the essence of the business.82 Second, all or substantially all of
78. Id.
79. Supra Part 1.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1991).
81. The courts use variations of this test and sometimes use only one or a combination
of the three parts. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
82. See id. (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971)). This is a separate and more restrictive defense than the business necessity defense
to disparate impact claims. Id.
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the protected class must be unable to effectively perform the job
duties. 83 Third, there can be no reasonable alternatives.8 4 This
Part analyzes the difficulty that owners of mascots have satisfying
these tests. However, the perceived "authenticity" exception
within a BFOQ defense may provide adequate protection for
mascots.
1. The Need for Discrimination Must Go Directly to the
Essence of the Business
An owner satisfies the first prong "when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively." 85 Courts and companies tend to disagree
when defining the "essence of the business," but courts ultimately
determine the primary purpose of the business. 86 These lines, as
one can imagine, are gray. The court in Wilson made their
decision on this prong.87  Southwest Airlines attempted to
establish its male-discriminating practices as a BFOQ by pointing
to its notable success in branding itself as a "love airline" with
"an image of feminine spirit, fun[,] and sex appeal." 88 The court
noted that while sex appeal could be a BFOQ for discriminating
against men for a company like Playboy, whose primary purpose
is to "titillate and entice male customers,"89 sex appeal could not
support a BFOQ when the primary purpose of the company, like
Southwest, is "to transport passengers safely and quickly from
83. See id. (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)).
84. See id. at 334 (holding that there were no reasonable alternatives allowing the
female officer to work within the penitentiary due to the "particularly inhospitable"
environment).
85. See id. at 333 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
86. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding
that an airline's primary function is "to transport passengers safely from one point to
another").
87. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[T]he
only issue to decide is whether Southwest has proved that being female is a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of its particular business.").
88. See id. at 294.
89. See id. at 301 (noting that "female sexuality [is] reasonably necessary to perform
the dominant purpose of the job which is forthrightly to titillate and entice male customers"
(citing St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, No. CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. State Human
Rights App. B. 1971)).
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one point to another." 90 Notably, the courts will circumvent the
unique methods companies execute to distinguish their service
from competitors, and even disregard the success of those
methods, unless they are essential to providing the service. 91
In the mascot context, the University will likely have a
difficult time tying its mascot to its primary purpose because it is
a multi-faceted institution with many goals. If the court looks at
the University as a whole, it will likely determine that the primary
purpose is to educate individuals and the community.92 At this
broad-stroke level, the BFOQ defense will quickly fail because
mascots are not essential to this educational purpose. Even if the
court isolated the primary purpose of the University to just the
athletic program, there is little hope that it will consider a
mascot's position essential to the primary purpose because
multiple universities and teams are successful without a costumed
mascot.93 Because the primary purpose test does not effectively
contemplate singular pieces of a multi-faceted organization, it is
likely that the University will lose its defense on the first prong.
90. See id. at 302 (also noting that "[w]hile possession of female allure and sex appeal
have been made qualifications for Southwest's contact personnel by virtue of the 'love'
campaign, the functions served by employee sexuality in Southwest's operations are not
dominant ones"); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388 (finding that an airline's primary function is "to
transport passengers safely from one point to another.").
91. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 295 (rejecting Southwest's argument that being female
was a BFOQ while conceding that Southwest's "youthful, feminine image" curated through
their hiring process had given the company a "distinct advantage").
92. See, e.g., Our Mission, U. ARK., [https://perma.cc/794J-29F9 ] (last visited Oct. 27,
2019) ("Providing access to a comprehensive and internationally competitive public
education, and fostering student success across a wide spectrum of disciplines."); see also
Vision and Mission, AUBURN U., [https://perma.cc/GB9A-9A7M] (last visited Oct. 27,
2019) ("Auburn University is committed to excellence in teaching at both the undergraduate
and the graduate level."); Mission, Vision, Values and Core Goals, OHIO ST. U.,
[https://perma.cc/PJM8-X8UJ] (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) ("Educating students through a
comprehensive array of distinguished academic programs[.]").
93. See, e.g., Meet Reveille IX, TEX. A & M U., [https://perma.cc/T4TS-5W89] (last
visited Oct. 27,2019) (noting that Reveille IX is the only mascot at Texas A&M University);
see also Scott Cacciola, Yankees' Long-Forgotten Mascot, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 15, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/FD6E-ARM5] (noting that the Yankees retired their mascot in 1981); Jon
Becker, A New Dubs Mascot Unveiled-but Not in Oakland, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 24,
2018), [https://perma.cc/BL26-6P37] (noting that the Golden State Warriors retired their
mascot in 2008).
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2. All or Substantially All of the Protected Class Is Unable to
Fulfill the Duties of the Job
If the University can prove that its mascot is tied to its
primary purpose, it is unlikely that the University will be able to
satisfy the second prong. An owner satisfies the second prong
when it can show that "all or substantially all" of the protected
class would be unable to fulfill the duties of the specific job.
9 4
Courts have teased this out to some degree by separating a job
description into "mechanical functions" and soft skills. 95 For
instance, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., Southwest failed to
establish that only women could perform the position of flight
attendant.96 While it described the duties as "entertain[ing] the
passengers and maintain[ing] an atmosphere of informality and
'fun' during flights," 97 the court noted that mere customer
preference was not strong enough to support the BFOQ defense.
98
Men could just as easily perform the tasks as the female flight
attendants. 99
In the context of mascots, the differentiation between
mechanical and soft skills seems furry at best. There are very few
skills that resemble traditional mechanical skills, such as physical
fitness requirements. Most of the skills fall into the court's
definition of soft skills, such as "entertain[ing] the [fans] and
maintain[ing] an atmosphere of informality and 'fun' during
[games]." 100  The ability to emulate the characteristics and
personality of the specific character falls somewhere in between
94. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388 (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)).
95. See id. (stating that at least some males can serve the "non-mechanical functions"
more commonly found in females).
96. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 295; see also Rowe, supra note 44, at 44-45 ("The
,stewardess' had to be 'a nurse in the sky, a surrogate wife for lonely business passengers, a
fantasy sexpot ("coffee, tea, or me"), and a fashion model') (quoting RICHARD THOMPSON
FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE
149 (2008)).
97. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 295.
98. See id. at 303 (noting that only when "customer preference for one sex is so strong
that the business would be undermined if employees of the opposite sex were hired" would
this factor be supportive of a BFOQ defense).
99. See id. at 300 ("Southwest concedes.. that males are able to perform safely and
efficiently all the basic, mechanical functions required of flight attendants and ticket
agents.").
100. Seeid. at 295.
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this dichotomy. Emulating personality is likely a soft skill, but
the physical ability to mimic the character's mannerisms is more
akin to a mechanical skill. Even so, there is no basis to say that
men cannot mimic the feminine characteristics of Sue E. 10 1
Another amorphous skill is the employee's ability to fill the
distinct body shape of the mascot. While this skill is more
physical in nature, it does not reflect the typical notion of"mechanical." This "skill" may require hiring criteria, such as a
height limit, which substantially limits the availability of
employment to a specific gender. 10 2  While the University can
attempt to fashion several traditional arguments, this part of the
test is ill-structured to fit the novel context of mascots.
3. The Owner Has No Reasonable Alternatives
Even if the University satisfies the first two prongs, the final
prong turns to whether the owner can utilize any reasonable
alternatives to accomplish the mission with less discriminatory
impact. 10 3 Many lower courts have required that "the employer
demonstrate that no less-restrictive alternative is available that
101. This type of skill seems, on its face, to conflict with the prohibition of gender
stereotyping. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); 1 BARBARA
T. LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 11-9 (Julia Campins et al.,
eds., 5th ed., 2012) [hereinafter LINDEMANN 5TH]. Similar to the employer in Price
Waterhouse, it would not be uncommon to tell the employee portraying Sue E. to walk, act,
or interact in a more "feminine" manner. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. There are
some factors, however, that distinguish the case of mascots from Price Waterhouse. For
instance, Title VU prohibits employers from "insisting that [the employee] match[] the
stereotype associated with their group," whereas universities would be insisting that the
employee match the personality and persona of the specific character. Id. at 251. There are
other female mascots who do not have the same demeanor as Sue E. Additionally, the
employee must only portray these characteristics when mascotting, not through the rest of
the job. Universities would not, and cannot under Price Waterhouse, discriminate against
an employee because he or she does not generally conform to the associated stereotype when
they are not mascotting.
102. For example, Disney requires that Mickey be within the height range of 4'8" to
5'2". See Don, What's Inside the Suit-Rigorous Requirements of a Disney Costumed
Character, DisNEYFANATIC.COM, [https://perma.cc/LV4N-WYMD] (last visited Oct. 27,
2019). This would disproportionally affect men as the maximum height requirement is at
the 0.651 percentile of the height chart. See Height Percentile Calculator, by Age or
Country, TALL.LIFE, [https://perma.cc/LW3G-DC6D] (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
103. See 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 405 (C. Geoffrey Weirich et al., eds., 4th ed., 2007) [hereinafter
LINDEMANN 4TH].
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would preclude the need for [the] discrimination."'10 4 The courts
typically invoke this analysis when the employment
discrimination stems from customer privacy,' 05 commonly in the
context of hospitals and prisons.'
06
In the context of mascots, the prong poorly fits. There are
no customer privacy interests at stake which conflict with the
gender of the University's mascot.10 7 Even if the hypothetical
court decided to expand the prong outside of privacy interests,
there are arguably other ways the University might maintain the
essence of the character without the absolute elimination of the
same. For instance, adjustable padding in the suit could allow for
various body shapes while maintaining a consistent, distinct
outward appearance, which is needed for intellectual property
protection.108 This, however, might not accommodate certain
attributes, such as height.' 09 Another avenue the University could
take to maintain its intellectual property while avoiding
discrimination is to keep multiple trademarks of different
"versions" of the character. However, this would tend to be
burdensome because the University would have to continually use
these "off' versions every so often to avoid abandonment of the
trademark.1 10 Regardless, the court would likely find that there
104. INDEMANN 5TH, supra note 101, at 10-15.
105. See id.; see, e.g., Reed v. Cty. of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1999);
Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1996).
106. See, e.g., Healey, 78 F.3d at 132 (addressing the tension between a patient's
privacy interests and the non-discriminatory interests of Title VII); Gunther v. Iowa State
Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir. 1980) (addressing the tension between a
prisoner's privacy rights and the non-discriminatory objective of Title VII).
107. In line with continuity of character, many universities require the identity of
mascots to be kept secret, but these are not the type of interests involved in the "reasonable
alternative" analysis.
108. See e-mail from Kamille Ratzlaff, Mascot Coach, Univ. of Kan., to author (Feb.
26, 2019) (on file with author) ("Our suit is fairly accommodating to different body shapes
as long as they fit within the height requirement. If someone is on the slimmer side of life,
we can always add padding."); see also e-mail from Michael Kussin, Mascot Coach, Univ.
of Colo. Boulder, to author (Mar. 6, 2019) (on file with author) ("We have different sized
jerseys that will fit different body shapes, however there is still an appearance that is
necessary to have.").
109. For example, stilts might be utilized to make an individual taller, but nothing can
be done to make a tall individual shorter.
110. In order to maintain the trademarks under the Lanham Act, the University would
have to use the various trademarks from time to time every three years. See 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (2006). This would force the University to hire individuals to specifically "fill" the
special trademarks, which would force the University to discriminate yet again.
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are alternatives that the University can take to avoid
discriminatory hiring practices.
4. Authenticity and Mascots
While all three parts may fail, there remains one thread of
hope within the BFOQ context: authenticity."' Lower courts
seemingly allow for narrow discrimination when the
discrimination relates to the authenticity of the business. 12 This
theory is rare, but it allows, for instance, directors to be seemingly
discriminatory in movie or play castings."13 It is also the theory
Disney utilizes in order to hire only those that fit the various
cultural profiles at EPCOT. 14
The context is slightly different in relation to mascots, but it,
nonetheless, should apply. As a trademarked creation, there is a
specific way that the character is supposed to look. The reality is
that when these characteristics (height, body shape, build, etc.)
change, the character effectively changes.' ' Surely, one can
remember when, as a kid, he would instantly notice any
differences in his favorite costumed character. When differences
are obvious, they kill the "magic" of the character. 116  It is not
1 11. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 48-49.
112. See Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison, 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
("It could be said that in order to operate an authentically atmospheric Chinese restaurant, it
is reasonably necessary to have the waiters and waitresses be Chinese.").
113. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
114. For example, Disney is allowed to discriminate against those who do not appear
to be of Norwegian descent in order to maintain an authentic feel when park guests visit the
Norway portion of the park. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 48-49; see also Gupta v. Walt
Disney World Co., 256 F. App'x 279, 282 (11 th Cir. 2007).
115. The University of Kansas regularly receives negative comments on their social
media when they have to use substitutes for their mascots who are different heights than their
typical characters. See Ratzlaff, supra note 108 ("[M]ost often the comments on [social
media] are "This isn't the real Baby, it's too tall"...or something to that effect."). Even
though the University of Colorado can adjust their suit for height, they have recognized that
there is a limit. See Kussin, supra note 108 ("Our suit is designed in a way that allows for
performers of a wide range of heights, but we typically notice that around and below the 5 '7"
mark ends up looking too much like [our other, shorter character].").
116. Ratzlaff, supra note 108 ("Our fan base knows exactly how these characters
should act and when they are off, we will get feedback. Fans grew up watching the games
and learning to love Big Jay and Baby Jay. It's an amazing thing when adults bring their
kiddos to the game and introduce the little ones to their 'friend' Big Jay and how they went
to college together. Grandma and Grandpa have told the kids about when Baby Jay was
hatched on the 50-yard-line during the Homecoming Game. These people have learned the
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uncommon for a child to call a character by a different name
because it looks so different from its intended image." 7 When
this "continuity of character" erodes, so does the value of the
character to the university.'1 18 These mascots take on lives of their
own which personify the University and enable those mascots to
interact with their fan base in a personal way. Therefore, there is
a great need to maintain strict hiring criteria for mascot selection
in order to preserve the authenticity of the character, as well as
protect the rights surrounding it.
B. Mascots as a Business Necessity
Returning to the hypothetical, Charlie could alternatively
attack the height-based hiring practice as a whole, arguing that the
seemingly neutral height-limit policy disproportionally impacts a
Title VII enumerated protected class, gender, in a discriminatory
fashion. Plaintiffs have raised this type of discrimination claim
in multiple contexts, such as entrance exams,1 19 height or weight
requirements, 120 and physical fitness requirements.1 21 Employers
must show that "the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." 122
Employers can meet this standard seemingly easier than the
BFOQ defense because, unlike the primary purpose analysis in
the BFOQ framework, the necessity does not need to be"essential" or "indispensable."' 123  Courts have allowed for
mascots' personalities and stories from the literal beginning of when they were created. Who
are we to change the personality of the faces that people have come to know and love?").
117. E-mail from John Kilpatrick, Former Mascot, Univ. of Ark., to author (Jun. 12,
2019, 08:05 CDT) (on file with author) ("[A]t times[,] when playing a character known to
be larger in size (Big Red), [] it's pretty common for me to get mistaken... for one of the
smaller characters, Pork Chop. Oftentimes, size plays a large role [in] the actual 'look' of a
character.").
118. "Continuity of character" is a phrase used in the industry which relates to the
mascot remaining the same, both physically and characteristically, even though the employee
changes.
119. See, e.g., Rieci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563-64 (2009).
120. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977).
121. See, e.g., id. at 324 n.2.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1991); see Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S.
205, 212 (2010).
123. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 50; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 659 (1989) ("[T]his degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most
employers to meet...."), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
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broader employment considerations, such as safety, cost, and,
potentially, intellectual property.124  These types of
considerations can help employers justify the discrimination in
order to protect their business models and marketing tools.
This is surely a relief for universities which cannot say that
the presence of their mascots is the primary purpose of the
business even though they are still very integral to the overall
experience.1 25  Universities can use considerations such as the
value of intellectual property rights of the character to justify its
disparate hiring criteria.1 26  While teams can be successful
without mascots, 127  there is a lot of value tied to these
characters. 128  These characters bring in significant financial
revenue to their respective programs through both appearances
and merchandise.1 29  Additionally, these characters bring
intrinsic, albeit intangible, value to the atmosphere and
experience of their programs. 130  Fans can hardly imagine the
166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).
124. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 50.
125. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
126. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 50. One consideration not as integral to this Article
would be the safety of the fetus during pregnancy. The body can experience more intense
temperatures and exertion while mascotting, which can negatively impact the health of the
fetus. The Supreme Court was clear, though, in UAW v. Johnson Controls in stating that
"fetal...safety was best left to the mother." See 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991). Although
discussing the BFOQ defense, the Court would likely find that while "[no] one can disregard
the possibility of injury to future children; the [business necessity defense], however is not
so broad that it transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of [mascotting]."
See id. at 203-04.
127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
128. See Brooks Barnes, Mickey Turns 90, and the Disney Marketing Machine
Celebrates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,2018), [https://perma.cc/JVP9-CYPE] (noting that "Mickey
and his friends.. generat[e] annual retail sales of at least $3.2 billion").
129. See Schauf, supra note 4 (stating that Goldy, the University of Minnesota mascot,
annually grosses between $70,000.00 and $90,000.00, which does not include the
promotions, advertisements, and sponsorships in which Goldy appears); see also Kussin,
supra note 108 (noting that Chip, the University of Colorado mascot, makes 150-200 paid
events a year charging $250.00 each).
130. See Ratzlaff, supra note 108 ("Fans want to get as close to the action as possible
and while they may not be able to be on the court with their favorite player, they can interact,
take a picture and even celebrate with the mascot."); see also Kussin, supra note 108 (noting
that Chip, the University of Colorado mascot, helps to create the home field advantage by
starting "slow claps," leading the wave, and entertaining fans with "shenanigans"); Schauf,
supra note 4 ("Goldy [,the University of Minnesota mascot,] is able to add more of a personal
touch. He is able to work the crowd and interact with almost everyone in attendance
throughout the game. It allows [for] a more personal experience, creating lifelong memories
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game experience being the same without their favorite characters.
Further, a child's experience with a mascot may be the first step
on his or her journey to attending that university.' 3
Courts should view the intellectual property rights
themselves as a business necessity. The exclusivity of these
characters, achieved through intellectual property protections, is
in part what makes them so valuable to universities. To ensure
that universities maintain their rights, they need to keep the
character the same. 13 2 By forcing universities to repeatedly bend
their timeless characters to the characteristics of one individual,
courts could force universities' mascots into variants that cannot
be protected by intellectual property law.' 33 Therefore, the strict
hiring criteria is a job-related business necessity required to
maintain the distinct shape of these characters and protect them
from outside competition. Although mascots might fare better in
this business necessity context, a successful defense under the
traditional framework still appears awkward and forced.
IV. ]INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS AN
INDEPENDENT DEFENSE TO EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
Because of the difficulties of forcing intellectual property
defenses into existing employment discrimination law, Professor
Elizabeth Rowe has developed a new framework to weigh these
with the fans."); Sanchez, supra note 4 ("When fans see our mascots, they are filled with not
only school spirit, but also fond memories of attending games as a child. When our fans see
our mascots outside our event venues, it shows them our willingness to come to them and
support their initiatives in the community, just like they come out and support our student-
athletes.").
131. See e-mail from Adam Devault, Dir. of Mktg. Entm't, Nashville Predators, to
author (Apr. 19, 2019) (on file with author) ("[A child's] love for the team often results in
attending that school which turns into being an alumn[us or alumna] of that school. Alumni
bring money to the school along with their children who often follow in the parents[']
footsteps and fall in love with the mascot!"); see also e-mail from Corey Edwards, Aubie
Mascot Program Advisor, Auburn Univ., to author (Apr. 3, 2019, 03:49 CST) (on file with
author) (noting feedback that Auburn kids "watch some of Aubic's annual highlight videos
every night before they go to bed"); Patrick Woodhead, The Importance of Brand
Consistency, MEDIUM (July 16, 2018), [https://perma.cc/MZ68-T59P] ("[Consistency] may
even turn customers into followers or brand advocates, if your identity is strong and
consistent enough.").
132. See ARDEN, supra note 69, at 76.
133. See id.
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competing interests. 134 Her framework is designed to address
"branded service[s]," but the test easily meets the various needs
of mascot employment. 135 The test is not necessarily meant to
serve as a separate affirmative defense when intellectual property
is present, but rather it is meant to serve as an alternative test
under the BFOQ or business necessity defense. 136 Her framework
seeks to strike a balance between the spirit of employment
discrimination law and the need to accommodate more novel
business models.' 
37
The test requires the employer to prove four elements: (A)
proof of the intellectual property; 138 (B) the relationship between
the intellectual property and the business practice; 139 (C) the
relationship to the intellectual property and the job description; 140
and (D) the relationship of the intellectual property to its business
success. 
14 1
A. Proof of Intellectual Property
In order for employers to satisfy this test, they must to show
that they have some intellectual property right to protect: the
character. 142 An owner can show these rights through registration
with the USPTO or through common law principles. 143
Registration is a much more tangible and concrete way for an
employer to prove this element. 144 To establish common law
protections, an employer will need to show that they used the
mark in relation to their business and that their consumers identify
the mark with that business. 145
134. Rowe, supra note 44, at 53.
135. Id. at26.
136. Id. at 54.
137. Id. at56.
138. Id.





144. Employers can register their trademark in the federal system by filing online with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See Apply Online, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., [https://perma.cc/PQ82-3E4M] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
145. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
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In the context of mascots, many universities and companies
have common law rights over their live-action characters. 146 This
analysis should charge employers to do one of two things. At the
very least, these employers should utilize their characters in such
a way that the mascot becomes one with the business, ensuring
that the mark satisfies the common law test. 147 A university can
accomplish this by having the character appear at as many
sporting, campus, and community events as possible so that the
character and the university become synonymous. The better
route for employers is to ensure that they have registered their
characters through some type of intellectual property medium:
trademark, patent, copyright, or all three.
B. Relationship of Intellectual Property to Business Practice
The next element an employer will have to prove is the
connection between the business practice and the intellectual
property, i.e., the character. 14 8 This may develop very similarly
to the business necessity test. 149 This analysis should be broader
than the former test and much more than the primary purpose test
within the BFOQ defense. 150 The employer must show that there
is a legitimate business purpose for the intellectual property. 151
An employer can show this by the purpose and value of the
intellectual property as well as the business model.
15 2
Alternatively, the employer could prove this using industry
trends. 153
In the context of mascots, a university may prove this
element in a number of ways. First, it may show the marketing
146. See, e.g., e-mail from Brian Hommel, LSU Trademark Licensing, La. State Univ.,
to author (Oct. 8, 2018) (on file with author) (noting that LSU has common law rights in its
mascot, Mike the Tiger, based on its longstanding use).
147. For example, Aubic the Tiger's presence permeates into every facet of Auburn
University, participating in thousands of events, starring in highlight videos, and even
managing his own clothing line. See Edwards, supra note 131.
148. Rowe, supra note 44, at 58.
149. See supra Section IlI.B.
150. Professor Rowe notes that this element may help strike a balance between a
business's self-serving interest and the court's complete discretion in defining the purpose
of the business. Intellectual property rights would be an objective or qualitative way to
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value of a mascot. 154 For example, mascots generate income for
universities through appearances, sponsorship amenities, and
licensed merchandise.' 55 Marketing value can also manifest in
more unquantifiable means, such as community-university
relations and rapport with the fan base. 15 6 A university may also
use industry trends. While some universities do not have
costumed mascots, a quick overview shows that many do.' 57
Finally, the closer to a university's purpose a mascot is, the easier
it will be for it to prove this element. Companies like Disney, for
example, will have a more successful case where their characters
are at the heart of their business, compared to universities where
the mascot can be a minor part of an overall marketing plan.118
This element further persuades employers to utilize their mascots
and tie them to their central purpose and scheme.
154. See Sanchez, supra note 4 ("[Our mascots] help us accomplish various fan
engagement initiatives in our venues including: meeting and greeting our fans throughout
the event space, encouraging active participation throughout the event, and aiding in various
marketing initiatives. By utilizing mascots in our strategic plans, we are able to cultivate
relationships with fans, both young and old, with a constant that helps deliver unforgettable
experiences through entertainment, relationships[,] and overall fun.").
155. See, e.g., Schauf, supra note 4. The marketing value is only one way for
employers to prove the business practice element. It is centrally tied to the business success
element of Professor Rowe's framework and, therefore, is discussed in more detail in Section
IV.D, infra.
156. The specifics of these unquantifiable metrics are discussed in greater detail in the
context of the business success element. See infra Section IV.D.
157. See, e.g., Spirit Squads, U. ARK., [https://perma.cc/K3W7-BKXJ] (last visited
Oct. 23, 2019) (Big Red, Boss Hog, Ribby, Pork Chop, and Sue E.); Spirit Squads: History
of Big Al, U. ALA., [perma.cc/88D3-CZUG] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019); About Aubie,
AUBURN U., [perma.cc/X4Z5-FKPF] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019); Albert & Alberta, U. FLA.,
[perma.cc/F3XT-6SPA] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019); Spirit Squad: Hairy Dawg, U. GA.,
[perma.cc/9R3Z-LHPX] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019); Mascots, U. KY., [perma.cc/6425-
FGHU] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (Wildcat and Scratch); LSU Mascot& Auditions, LA. ST.
U., [perma.cc/CQD2-F7D5] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (Mike the Tiger); Bully, MISS. ST.
U., [perma.cc/WR4Y-5DAG] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019); Welcome Tony, U. MISS.,
[perma.cc/H3C6-V75K] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019); 2015-2016 General Roster: Truman the
Tiger, U. Mo., [perma.ce/A9HL-PEDV] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (Truman the Tiger);
History and Biography of Cocky, U. S.C., [perma.cc/M2FD-2VY3] (last visited Oct. 23,
2019); Cheer, Dance & Mascots: Mascots, U. TENN., [perma.cc/RGJ4-U3RB] (last visited
Oct. 23, 2019) (Smokey, Junior Smokey, and Davy Crockett); Vanderbilt Spirit Programs:
Mr. Commodore, VAND. U., [perma.cc/83PG-FHJJ] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
158. For example, Aubie the Tiger at Auburn University participates in events on and
off the field and "has become a very advantageous image for Auburn marketing across the
board." Edwards, supra note 131.
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C. Relationship of Intellectual Property to the Job
Description
The next element will ask the court to analyze the
relationship of the intellectual property to the job description. 1
59
Essentially, this element requires the employer to defend why the
intellectual property is an important qualification of the job.
160
Professor Rowe points out that courts typically give great
deference to employers under the business judgment rule to
define these job descriptions. 161 If the employer can then prove
this, it weakens the plaintiff's claim that he or she was indeed
qualified. 16
2
In the context of mascots, employers would likely rely on the
authenticity rationale. In order to have an authentic, life-like
character, that character must remain the same. 163  While the
employer or coach can arguably teach the employee the correct
personality and mannerisms, more physical criteria are difficult
or impossible to adjust, such as making a person shorter or their
shoulders narrower. 164 If a court allows for these qualifications
to lose their gravity, the character would inherently change and
ultimately lose intellectual property protection. The job
description for mascots helps avoid losing intellectual property
protection by maintaining the consistency of the mascot's
appearance. If an employer is going to reap the benefits of having
their character brought to life as a mascot, they will have to keep
the character consistent or else lose their rights all together.'
65
159. Rowe, supra note 44, at 58. Universities, especially those with multiple
characters, can argue that the job is "mascot" rather than the specific character, like "Sue E."
For the purposes of this Section, this Article will treat thejob description as character specific
as that would be the most strictly construed definition.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 58-59.
162. Professor Rowe notes that this element is extremely important as it attacks the
heart of a plaintiffs prima facie case that they were qualified. See id. at 58.
163. See Ratzlaff, supra note 108 (noting that fans comment, "This isn't the real Baby
[Jay], it's too tall" when the character is disproportional).
164. While a person's weight can greatly fluctuate, their body structure is relatively
static. Any changes would have to be made through very specific workout to re-shape the
musculature of the body, which would take long periods of time. Finally, some traits like
height are never going to change. These traits can sometimes be compensated for with
modifications to the suit, however, many times they cannot.
165. See Warren Publ'g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402, 434 (E.D. Penn. 2009).
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This element also challenges employers to be more stringent
on their hiring requirements. This provides some benefit to the
employee as intellectual property creates more defined hiring
criteria. Without this prong, employers could arbitrarily use
qualifications to discriminate against employees. 166 This element
arguably keeps employers honest as they have a very specific
standard for which they have to hire. 1
67
D. Relationship between Intellectual Property and Business
Success
The last element addresses the economic profitability of the
intellectual property. 168 The economic profitability is why these
assets are so vigorously protected by the law. Without this
demonstration, a company could arbitrarily create intellectual
property guidelines that allow it to discriminate against certain
individuals. 169 The traditional metric for value is money, but this
will not work in all instances.
In the context of mascots, the traditional monetary metric
will prove problematic for universities that will have to somehow
quantify their character's value in order to succeed on this
defense. As a marketing tool, mascots do not necessarily generate
an independent revenue line for their respective companies.17
Many times, companies use characters to increase customer or fan
relations. 171 For example, Aubie the Tiger at Auburn University
makes about 1,000 community appearances a year for free. 72
This obviously has an intrinsic value. To show the value that the
166. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 55.
167. Id. at 56-57.
168. Id. at 59.
169. Id. ("Because of the important antidiscrimination policies at stake, however, it is
desirable that the mere presence of IP does not necessarily make the defense successful.
Rather, the IP ought to be at the core of the company's economic success.")
170. Sanchez, supra note 4 ("[W]c don't have current metrics detailing the revenue
generation that our 'Ribby' mascot [and] logo has created[.]").
171. See id. ("They help us accomplish various fan engagement initiatives in our
venues including: meeting and greeting our fans throughout the event space, encouraging
active participation throughout the event, and aiding in various marketing initiatives. By
utilizing mascots in our strategic plans, we are able to cultivate relationships with fans, both
young and old, with a constant that helps deliver unforgettable experiences through
entertainment, relationships[,] and overall fun.").
172. See Edwards, supra note 131.
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character adds to its organization, Auburn University would have
to create with some metric, potentially social media analytics.1
73
Recently established universities and their characters could
have significant difficulties demonstrating the relationship
between their intellectual property and the success of the
organization.'74 Money will not suffice as a metric as the
university may not be established yet, much less the character.
While the future potential profit might serve as a metric, this will
likely be arbitrary and uncertain. The intellectual property rights
in themselves, however, might serve as the business success
element. 175 If a university is not able to maintain strict hiring
criteria based on body shape due to employment discrimination
law, it may never be able to register its character to protect the
character from competitors. 
176
This element challenges employers in two ways. First,
because the analysis relies on metrics, the university should be
readily identifying how, quantitatively, their mascot adds value to
the business. If the character does not currently add value
according to those metrics, then the university should find ways
to add that needed value. Secondly, it encourages universities to
utilize their characters in a 2-D fashion and generate value before
launching them into the real world.
V. APPLICATION IN OTHER PROTECTED CLASSES
This Article primarily focuses on gender discrimination
within mascot hiring. This protected class likely faces the most
discrimination within the mascot industry due to body shape and
height requirements. 177  However, for universities to form
effective hiring criteria that adequately protects their marks, it is
important to also acknowledge how other Title VII protected
classes might dull the distinctness of a character. This Section
173. For example, Auburn University could maintain social media analytics since
Aubie "reach[es] over 250,000 followers on Auburn Football's Instagram account alone and
even more viewers on accounts such as the PGATour." Id.
174. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 59.
175. See generally Kelvin King, The Value of Intellectual Property, Intangible Assets
and Goodwill, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., [https://perma.cc/M8TA-YHV3] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019).
176. See ARDEN, supra note 69, at 76.
177. For example, University of Kansas maintains height requirements of 4'l 1" to 5'l"
for Baby Jay and 6'1" to 6'5" for Big Jay. See Ratzlaff, supra note 108.
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will explore, albeit in less detail, a couple additional classes that
might readily affect the look of a character.
A. Pregnancy
Pregnancy discrimination falls under Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination. 178  An employer cannot dismiss an
employee from work until her pregnancy becomes a significant
impediment to her duties. 179  Within the context of mascots,
pregnancy could limit the person's ability to distinctly portray the
character. As the mother moves farther into her term, the
character will likewise begin to take a pregnant form. This
impacts not only the body shape of the character, weakening the
intellectual property protections, but also the story of the
character. 180 A university has a strong interest in maintaining
both aspects of its mascot. In contrast to other types of
employment, a university could not grant adequate pregnancy
leave as the duration of employment is generally limited to nine
months. In addition, it could not provide alternative employment
because there are not typically other available mascot jobs. 181
Therefore, the framework described above might be invoked as a
defense for discriminating against an employee who becomes
pregnant during the course of her mascot career.
B. Race
Not all mascots are covered from head to toe in fur. 182 For
those university mascots who elect to show their more "human"
178. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1979).
179. See LINDEMANN 5TH, supra note 101, at 10-62; see also Ensley-Gaines v.
Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that a plaintiff must be similarly
situated in their ability to work as to a non-pregnant employee).
180. This would be equivalent to fans exclaiming that this isn't the real mascot or
asking whether the mascot is well. See Ratzlaff, supra note 108. Additionally, this would
likely raise questions from children about exactly how the mascot became pregnant and
where the baby went after birth. This situation is complicated even more by a mascot's
inability to verbally communicate.
181. Most universities only have one character, and if they do have another, that
character likely does not fit the body shape of an employee who is pregnant. See supra note
157.
182. See, e.g., Then & Now: Purdue Pete, PURDUE U. (Feb. 22, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/LQM7-Y69J]; Notre Dame Introduces Diverse Leprechaun Class for
2019-20, U. NOTRE DAME (Apr. 16, 2019), [https://perma.ec/N4MJ-LK58]; Chris Ross, K-
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side, the student's race might affect the distinctness of the
trademarked character. Title VII clearly prohibits any
discriminatory employment action on the basis of race.
183
Uniquely, Title VII does not mention race when addressing the
BFOQ defense.184 Courts have interpreted this absence to mean
that the BFOQ defense cannot justify racial employment
discrimination; 185 however, the possibility remains for the
employer to use the business necessity defense to justify a facially
neutral policy.'
1 86
In the context of mascots, the business necessity would be
the intellectual property of the character. Intellectual property
rights have prevailed in contexts outside employment law even
when the mark is associated with racially offensive material.187
The courts have justified this bolstered support of intellectual
property through the additional protections of the First
Amendment. 88 Offensive mascots aside,1 89 it is at least plausible
that a university could utilize the framework above and the First
Amendment to maintain strict hiring criteria to protect its
characters from outside competition.
C. Potential Modifications
While a university could utilize the framework created by
Professor Rowe and described in this Article, the court should
also consider other factors when making its determination. First,
the court should examine the actual components of the intellectual
State 's Newly Unveiled Willie the Wildcat Statue Is Super Creepy, LANDGRANT GAUNTLET
(Apr. 6, 2017), [https://perma.cc/XPC2-768X].
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2 .
185. See LINDEMANN 5TH, supra note 101, at 6-16; see also Ferrill v. Parker Grp., 168
F.3d 468,473 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th
Cir. 2010).
186. See LINDEMANN 5TH, supra note 101, at 6-16; see also Ferrill, 168 F.3d at 474.
187. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764-65 (2017) (holding that the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office could not refuse to register the racially offensive trademark "The
Slants" because the "disparagement clause" of the Lanham Act was drawn too broadly to
satisfy the First Amendment tests).
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Michael Rosen, Here Are All the Racist College Mascots Left in the
United States, SPLINTER (Dec. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/7GXF-Z5DR] (pointing to
mascots such as University of Nevada, Las Vegas's Hey Reb! and San Diego State's Aztec
Warrior).
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property of the mascot. For example, race should never be a
factor in mascot hiring when the character is completely covered
by the suit. Second, even when the mascot suit does not cover the
student from head to toe, the court should balance the four
preceding elements1 90 against the relative scrutiny of the
protected class. In particular, the court should require an even
greater showing of business success and necessity of the
intellectual property when faced with a policy that disparately
impacts a race class, rather than a gender class. These two steps
would at least begin to address the uncomfortable tension
between a university's valuable intellectual property and the
different protected classes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article does not advocate for employment
discrimination. However, it does recognize that selective mascot
hiring rests within a murky penumbra of employment
discrimination law and intellectual property law. Employers and
universities would benefit from bringing diverse characters to
their organizations.1 91 As these characters come alive, it would
behoove universities to have mascots with which "people are able
to identify themselves" so that they may "ring true to the
audience." 192 But for this to occur, mascots must be unique and
distinguishable. If the courts allowed employment rights to take
precedence, mascots would be forced into an amorphous,
indistinct existence, unprotectable by intellectual property law.
Mascots are a part of our everyday lives. They make their
way onto our screens, products, and universities. Some of these
characters have become so distinct that they have taken on a life
of their own, far beyond the hopes and dreams of their creators.
Effectively, these mascots are very much alive. The power of
personification makes mascots extremely valuable to universities.
As such, universities need a way to enforce strict, selective hiring
190. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
191. For example, Notre Dame should be applauded for diversifying their
Leprechauns, but the University may have a difficult time if it wants to enforce intellectual
property rights over the character. U. NOTRE DAME, supra note 182. However, Notre
Dame's situation may be salvageable as it is more analogous to Professor Rowe's article
regarding branded service and employee outfits. See generally Rowe, supra note 44.
192. KLEIN, supra note 1.
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criteria to maintain the distinctness of their characters and protect
them from outside competitors. While intellectual property
provides ample protection in many cases, the traditional
employment discrimination framework remains an area where
these protections do not cohesively fit. The result in this niche
setting is less than adequate protection for such valuable assets.
The solution is a new framework that adequately weighs a mascot
owner's interests in the lifelike characters against those of
employees that bring mascots to life.
